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[L. A. No. 20699. In Bank. August 4, 1950.1

SAMUEL R. GOLDING et al., Respondents, v. R.K.O.
PICTURES, INC. (8 Corporation) et a1., Appellants.
[1] Literat7 Property-Infringement-BlementB.-To recover for
infringement or piracy of an author's common-law right iD
literary property, three elements must be established: ownership by plaintifl' of a protectible property interest; UDauthorized copying of the material by defendant; and damage
resulting from the copying.
[2] IcL-Nature and Bxtent uf Right.-Literary property in the
fruits of a writer's creative endeavor extend to the ful~ scope
of bis inventiveness, and this may include, in the case of
a stage play or a moving picture scenario, the entire plot,
the unique dialogue, the fundamental emotional appeal or
theme of the story, or merely certain novel sequences or combinations of otherwise hackneyed elements.
[3] Id.-Nature an~ Extent of Right.-It is only the product of
a writer's creativ l mind which is protectible in an action for
infringement of his literary property.
[4] Id.-Remedies-Bvidence.-Inasmuch as there will seldom be
direct evidence of plagiarism, the trier of fact must necessarily rely on circumstantial evidence and the reasonable
inferences which may be drawn from it to determine the
issu,e;
[6] Id.-Remedies-Bvidence.-An inference of copying a literary
work which will support an allegation of plagiarism may arise
when there is proof of access coupled with a showing of
similarity.
[6] Id.-Remedies-Bvidence.-Where there is strong evidence
of an alleged infringer's access to plaintiff's literary work,
less proof of similarity in the alleged infringing work may
suffice to prove plagiarism; conversely, if the evidence of
access is uncertain, strong proof of similarity should be
shown before the inference of copying may be indulged.
[7] Id.-Similarity of Identity of CompositionB.-In determining
the question of similarity between plaintiff's literary property
and the alleged infringing work, it is only similarity as to
plaintiff's protectible property that is relevant; thus where
[I} See 16 CaLJur. 665; 34 Am.Jur. 448.
McB:. Dig. References: [1-17, 19J Literary Property; (18J
Evidence, § 527.
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the property interest in a play or scenario entitled to protection extends only to certain sequences or characters, similarity of the plaintiff's and defendant's works as to other
phases of the play or scenario is irrevelant.
[8J Id. - Bemedies - Damages.-The rules governing the determination of damages for infringement or piracy of a playwright's protectible interest in his literary work are the
same as apply to any other form of personal property.
[9] Id.-Bemedies-Evidence.-The central dramatic situation of
a play entitled "The Man and His Shadow," emphasizing a
ship captain's controlling monomania for authority and
power, was shown to constitute protectible literary property
by evidence that this theme rather than the specific dialogues or sequence of scenes constituted the truly original
and valuable feature of the story, and by the fact that it
was not a mere abstract idea but had been reduced to the
form of a full stage play.
[10] Id.-Subject Matter-Originality.-The fact that the plan or
theme of a story is similar to the plots of prior stories does
not defeat the claim of originality within the meaning of that
word for copyright purposes.
[11] Id.-Bemedies-Evidence.-In an action for plagiarism of
a play by the producers of a motion picture, opportunity and
inclination to pirate plaintiffs' literary property was supported by testimony that the play was submitted to defendant
producer to read and consider, that in one of plaintiffs' di.&cussions with the producer regarding the acceptability of the
story for moving picture purposes the producer stated, "I
don't have to buy my stories. I don't have to layout money
for originals; . get my ide~ and I call in a couple of writer.
in the lot and I make my stories that way," and that the
manuscript was returned to plaintiffs a few days later.
[l2J Id.-Bemedies-Evidence.-In an action for plagiarism of a
play by the prodncers of a motion picture, proof of accesa
establishes no more than the opportunity to copy and not
actual copying, and liability for damages must rest on substantial evidence of similarity between plaintiffs' literary
property and the moving picture produced by defendants.
[13J Id.-Bemedies-Appea.1-Beview of Evidence.-In an action
for plagiarism of a play by the produllers of a motion picture,
a determination by the jury of the issue of similarity is not
conclusive on appeal unless it is supported by substantial
evidence.
[14] Id.-Bemedies-Evidence.-The mere existence of two dramatic works. in evidence does not, per Be, constitute 8ufticient
evidence of similarity. It is necessary to read or view the
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two works to see if they present any substantial similarity
insofar as the complaining playwright's property in his work
is concerned.
[16) Id.-Infringement-Copying.-Where a motion picture contains all the elements of the basic dramatic situation of a
stage play alleged to be infringed, differences in the minor
characters and the locale of the story go to the quality of the
plagiarism and not to :ts existence or nonexistence.
[18) Id.-Inrrmgement-Testa.-on the issue of originality of
& stage play alleged to have been infringed by a moving picture, it is not necessary that comparison be made without
dissecting the works, but dissection should first be mad~ to
d~termine wherein plaintiff has a protectible property interest, and, after establishing that he has a protectible property
right, a c~mparison may then be made between the two works
,as to the original and protectible portion only.
[11) IcL-8imilarity or Identity of CompositiODS.-Where an author's protectible property right extends only to a portion of
a play, to its dramatic core, the comparison of such play with
an alleged infringing moving picture must be OD the basis
. of an average observer looking at that portion.
[18] Evtdence-OpiDion Evidence-Values.-An owner of a dramatic play is competent, without being quali1l.ed as an expert,
to testify as to the value or worth of the property.
[19) Literar)' Property-Remedies-Damages.-In an action for
infringement of a play by the produCers of a motion picture,
testimony of the playrights that the value of the play before
the infringement was between $25,000 and $50,000 and that
it had DO value after the production and distribution of the
picture supported an award of $25,000 for its infringement.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa
Angeles County and from ano~der denying motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Ingall W. Bull, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for damages for infringement of literary property.
Judgment for plaintiffs afBrmed.
Mitchell, Silberberg & Knupp and Guy Knupp for Appel.
lants.

Loeb & Loeb and Herman F. Selvin, Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellants.
Harold A. Fendler for Respondents.
EDMONDS, J .-In an action for the infringement of
literary property, the producers of a motion picture appeal

J
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from a judgment awarding the authors of the assertedly
plagiarized stage play damages ill the sum of $25,000. The
sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgmellt is the
principal question presented for decision.
Samuel R. Golding and Norbert Faulkner, both well·
established writers, collaborated in writing a play. entitled,
"The Man and His Shadow." They neither published nor
dedicated it to the public and it was not copyrighted. The
Pasadena Playhouse produced the play in December, 1942.
After the authors made some revisions, they submitted it to
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., and Val Lewton, a producer.
Lewton retained the manuscript for about six weeks. At
that time, according to the evidence, Lewton was looking
for a story with the action on board a ship in order to utilize
an old set which was available. The appellants admit accesS
to the play in that a copy of it was in the custody of Lewton for
some time.
In August, 1943, the appellants released the motion picture
entitled "The Ghost Ship" and this action followed. Upon the
trial, the play was read to the jurors and the motion picture
was shown to them. After they returned a verdict for damages
in the amount of $25,000, a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied. The appeal is from the
judgment and from the order denying the motion.
The .central dramatic situation or core in which the plaintifi's claim property is as follows: The action takes place on
board a ship. Only one person aboard, a passenger, suspects
the captain of being a murderer. He accuses the captain who
neither admits nor denies the acctlsation; in fact, to his crew
and passengers the captain clearly implies that his accuser is
either guilty of hallucinations or himself desires to kill him.
t
The accuser knows that he is subject to the captain's whims
1;·· and is in a position where he can be killed or imprisoned.
~
The captain, sure of his authority, informs the accuser that he
is free to try to convince anyone on board ship of the truth of
his suspicions. The passenger tells his story to the first mate
and to others on the ship but they refuse to believe him and
instead suspect the passenger of hallucinations or malice•.
r, Finally, however, the captain becomes aware that he is suspeeted by at least one other person and he threatens to kill,
I
or does kill that person as an intermeddler. Knowledge that
! his murders are about to be uncovered causes him to lose bia
mind and brings about his own undoing and death.

1.

t,
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In the plaintiffs' play this basic dramatic core waa filled·
out by placing the passengers and crew upon a pleasure'
cruise and making the captain an imposter who haa come!
to show his superiority to the man in whose shadow he \
has worked for years. This man is the person throughout who I
knows the captain's true identity. There are various other:
subcharacters who give body and filling to the central plot, but:
aa testifi.ed. to by both GOld.ing and Faulkner, this matter waa \'
all superficial and could be changed in innumerable ways without affecting the literary property and its value.
I
The moving picture "Ghost Ship" has its captain aa the
dominant figure of the story. .The locale of the drama is on a
freighter with members of the crew having the subordinate
roles. The ship carries no passengers and, to that extent, the
minor characters are quite different from those in the play.
However, the captain and his obsession with authority and the
fact that no one aboard can successfully challenge his· position is found in the picture, as is the dramatic struggle between
the captain and his adversary, the one person who knows his
true nature. Basically, the psychological situation is that
described by the plaintiffs aa the dramatic core of their work.
The producers contend that the evidence does not support
the finding of plagiarism. The correct standard for making
comparison between the play and the picture, they aasert,
is that of an ordinary observer; if dissection, rather than observation, is necessary to determine the question of similarity,
a finding of infringement is unwarranted. They also claim
that the evidence is insufficient to support the award of damages. In answer, the respondents argue -thatH'Whether -01'---;not similarities are apparent to an •ordinary observer' and :
support a finding of copying is a question of fact upon which
the jury's unanimous determination is conclusive."
[1] The rights aaserted in this caae are not baaed upon
statutory copyright but stem from the so-called common-law
copyright. (Civ. Code. § 980.) Upon such a cause of action,
to recover for infringement, or piracy, of literary property,
three elements must be established: (1) ownership by the
plaintiff of a protectible property interest; (2) unauthorized
eopying of the material by the defendant; and (3) damage
resulting from the copying. (See Caruthera v. B.E.O. Radio
Picturu, 1M., 20 F. Supp. 906, 907.)
[2] Literary property in the fruits of a writer's creative
endeavor extend to the full scope of his inventiveness. This
may well include, in the ease of a stage play or tQ.OVing picture

a
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scenario, the entire plot, the unique dialogue, the fundamental
emotional appeal or theme of the story, or merely certain
novel sequences or combinations of otherwise hackneyed elements. [3] It is, however, only the product of the writer's
creative mind which isprotectible. If only a portion of the
play or story is original and the remainder is but an orthodox
collection of filler comprising matters in the public domain,
the property right must be fully analyzed and closely defined,
because in the subsequent determination of the issue of copying, it is necessary to make a comparison of the two works,
and such comparison is of value only if it is based upon a
correct determination of the issue as to the extent and nature
of the plaintiff's protectible interest.
The question as to whether the claimed original or novel idea
has been reduced to concrete form is an issue of law. The
determination of it must be made as a condition precedent to
the vesting of any rights stemming from the common law copyright. The plaintiff must establish, as the subject of the
cause of action, a right in the nature of property which is
capable of ownership. Certainly, if the only product of the
writer's creative mind is not something which the law recognizes as protectible, that is, an idea not reduced to concrete
, form (O'Brien v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 68 F.Supp. 13), no
right of action for infringement of literary property will lie
even if the idea assertedly infringed is original and the result
of his independent labor.
[4] After a plaintiff has established a protectible property
right, the further issue, common to (Ill copyright cases, statutory or common law, is: Was the plaintiff's material copied
by the defendant' There will seldom be direct evidence of
plagiarism, and necessarily the trier of fact must rely upon
circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences which
may be drawn from it to determine the issue.
[5] An inference of copying may arise when there is proof
of access coupled with a showing of similarity. (Shipman v.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 538; O'Rourke v.
R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 44 F.Supp. 480, 482.) [6] Where
there is strong evidence of access, less proof of similarity may
suffice. Conversely, if the evidence of access is uncertain, strong
proof of similarity should be shown before the inference of
copying may be indulged. [7] It is particularly important to
·keep clearly in mind, insofar as the question of similarity is
concerned, that it is only similarity as to the plaintiff's pro-
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tectible property which is relevant. Thus, if the property interest entitled to protection extends only to certain sequences
or characters, similarity of the plaintiff's and the defendant's
works as to other phases of the play or scenario is wholly
irrelevant.
[8] If it is established that the plaintiff has a protectible
property in his literary work and there was copying, the
elements of liability for infringement or piracy are established
and all that remains is the determination of damages. On this
latter issue,· the rules are the same with regard to literary
property as apply to any other form of personal property.
(Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 32 Cal.App.2d 556 [90 P.2d
371]; Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d
354.)
The plaintiffs do not claim that their entire play, or any
particular sequence or dialogue, was directly or totally pirated.
Their insistence throughout has been that the thing of value
in their play is the central dramatic situation and the interplay of the dominant and secondary characters upon each
other. All other characterizations and dialogue are admittedly
nothing more than hackneyed filler which could be added or
subtracted without affecting the value or substance of the
plaintiffs' literary property.
Golding testified that when Lewton became reluctant to
purchase the play, he told the producer that a moving picture
of "The Man and His Shadow" could be based upon very
simple lines, and the action need not necessarily take place on
a pleasure yacht. The story might well be played in all its
dramatic aspects on a freighter, having an ordinary captain
and an ordinary crew.. There is one important dramatic
--- ---jlgure in-this 1llayand only one, he said, the captain, with
his insane lust for power, driving to carry out his sadistic
objectives. And as the production on the Pasadena stage was
summarized by the witness, "the sub-story of the other characters seemed very much warped and almost trivial as compared
to the figure of the captain who dominated the scene when he
appeared. "
[9] The first question presented for decision is whether
this basic dramatic situation constitutes protectible literary
property. On the subject of the use of such plots Faulkner,
who formerly had been a; story editor at a studio, testified that
"the basic duty of [the story editor] is to read a book or .••
play . . . and condense the story theme into two or three
paps. This material is then 'UlBed for comereDCe8 with pro-
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ducers and executives of the studios so they don't have to read
the whole book or play...• You have in studios a great
problem of budget. . . . That means the studio gives a producer an assignment and says, 'Here is a story, but ... we
don't want you to spend more than this amount of money for
the production.' . . . Now in such cases, the story editor
goes in and talks over the story with the producer, he says,
'You can do this story... , for the lower budget cost because
you can eliminate certain incidents, certain persons, certain
settings, so that you can create the same basic theme and
powerful story. . . .' "
According to this evidence, the real value of a story or play
may have little to do with specific dialogues or sequence of
scenes or locale and there is ample evidence tending to prove
that the basic dramatic core of the plaintiffs' play constitutes
the truly original and valuable feature of it. Further, there
was testimony to the effect that this particular psychological
drama, with its emphasis upon the captain's controlling monomania for authority and power, was particularly well timed
with the early days of the war and, therefore, of unusual value
at that time.· Nor was it a mere abstract idea. It had been
reduced to the form of a full stage play. Its creators had
embellished it with much of the trappings that give form, if
not substance, to such literary work.
[10] The fact that the plan or theme of the plaintiffs' story
is similar to the plots of prior stories does not defeat the claim
; of originality within the meaning of that word for copyright .
Lpurposes. "It is not essential t1J.at any production, to be
original or new within the meaning of the law of copyright,
shall be different from another . . . the true test of originality
is whether the production is the result of independent labor or
of copying." (Drone, Copyrights, cited with approval in
Fred Fishe,., Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145, 151; to same effect,
Amdur on Copyrights, § 3, pp. 69, 70.) It is of no consequence
that R.K.O. could have obtained the story from another source,
; when there is strong evidence from which the jury has reason" ably concluded that the scenario of "Ghost Ship" was copied
rfrom the plaintiffs' play. "Any subsequent person is, of
~course, free to use all works in the public domain as sources for
his compositions. No later work, though original, can take that
; from him. But there is no reason in justice or law why he
~. should not be compelled to resort to the earlier works them'.elves, or why he should be free to use the composition of
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another, who himself has not borrowed. If he claims the rights
of the public, let him use them j he picks the brains of the
copyright owner as much, whether his original composition be
old or new. The defendant's concern lest the public should
be shut off from the use of works in the public domain is
therefore illusory; no one suggests it." (Fred Fisher, Inc. v.
Dillingham, supra, p. 150.) Or, as stated by Justice Holmes:
•• Others are free to copy the original. They are not free to
copy the copy." (Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
188 U.S. 239, 249 [23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460].)
Concerning the issue of copying, and its subsidiary determinations of access and similarity, the evidence as to access
is strong. The producers of the motion picture have conceded
access, but because the inference of copying must rest upon
both access and similarity, it is necessary to examine, to a
certain extent, the nature of the evidence of access.
[11] It appears without conflict that the plaintiffs' play
was submitted to Lewton to read and consider. Both Golding
and Faulkner testified to conversations with Lewton regarding
the acceptability of the story for moving picture purposes. In
one of the discussions of it, according to Golding, Lewton
stated: " Well, Golding, I don't have to buy my stories. I
don't have to layout money for originals; I get my idea and
I call in a couple of writers on the lot and I make my stories
that way." It was a few days later that the manuscript was
returned to plaintiffs. The evidence of opportunity and,
indeed, inclination to pirate plaintiffs' literary property is,
therefore, clearly supported by the evidence.
[12] Proof of access, however, establishes no more than the
opportunity to copy and not actual copying. (Kustoff v.
Chaplin. 120 F.2d 551. 560; Cain v. Universal Pict1~res Co., 47
F.Supp. 1013, 1015.) And liability for damages must rest
upon substantial evidence of similarity between plaintiffs'
literary property and the moving picture produced by the
defendants. The play was read to the jury and the picture
was viewed by them. There was no other evidence of similarity
offered or received, and whether such evidence is sufficient to
sustain the jury's implied finding of similarity is a question
which can only be determined npon appeal by reading the
play and seeing the moving picture, which have been done by
this court.
[13] The parties are directly at variance as to whether this
issue of similarity presents a question of law or of fact. The
onq direct statements in the cases appear to confirm the
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playwrights' position that it is a question of fact for the jury.
(Universal Pictures 00. v. Harold Lloyd Oorp., 162 F.2d 354,
360; Dam v. Kirke La Shells 00.,166 F. 589.) However, they
extend this point too far when they contend that the determination by the jury of this issue "is conclusive" upon appeal.
No finding of fact is binding upon an appellate court if it is
not supported by substantial evidence. The function of this
court, when the contention of insufficiency is made, is to
examine the record to ascertain whether there is evidence to
support the verdict of the jury.
[14] The situation presented by the issue of similarity is a
peculiar one. There is always some evidence in the record.
That is to say, if plagiarism is claimed there will always be a
play by the plaintiff and one assertedly copied from it by the
defendant. Yet the mere existence of two dramatic works in
evidence does not. per se, constitute sufficient evidence of
similarity. It is necessary to read or view the two works to
see if they present any substantial similarity insofar as the
piaintiff's property in his work is concerned. This is not
to say that the appellate court will substitute itself for the
jury to decide what it thinks of the issue of similarity; it is
merely a question of determining if there is any substantial
evidence of similarity to support the jury's finding.
[15] In the present case, the movie "Ghost Ship" contains
all the elements of the plaintiffs' basic dramatic situation. It
is true that the story is placed on a freighter instead of a
luxury cruiser, that it showed no passengers but only the crew
aboard, and that there are many differences in the minor
characters. "Evidence of these differences is relevant upon
the question of [similarity] ... , but if such differences are
shown to exist, the question remain!ol for the trier of fact to
decide the issue." (Universal Pictures 00. v. Harold Lloyd
Oorp., supra; Maurel v. Smith. 220 F. 195, 199: Sheldon v.
Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Oorp .• 81 F.2d 49. 56.) The basic
factors of the play and the moving picture show strong similarity in their respective plots although superficially there is
considerable difference. But such differences go to the quality
of the plagiarism, and not to its existence or nonexistence.
[18] The appellants' main contention. however, is that in
making a comparison of the two works, •• the standard of the
ordinary observer should be applied-that is. the comparison
should be made withont dissection of the works under observation and without expert or elaborate analysis." (Harold
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Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 18 j Frankel v. Irwin, 34
F.2d 142, 144; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692.) It is,
therefore, argued that the court must look at the two plays as a
whole to determine if they would impress the average observer
as similar. The argument suffers from oversimplification.
The rule of law stated is correct insofar as the issue of similarity is concerned, but it has no application to the preliminary
issue of originality or a plaintiff's protectible property
interest.
[17] It is essential from the nature of the inquiry as to
originality to first dissect the play to determine wherein, if
at all, plaintiffs have any protectible property right. Assuming this is established, then comparison may be made between
the two works as to the original and protectible portion only.
If, as may often be the case, plaintiff's rights extend to the
entire play, then the trier of fact should compare the one with
the other. Whenever, as in Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting
System, ante, p. 653 [221 P.2d 73], the plaintiff establishes his
owner$ip of an original combination and arr&ngement of
various elements into a new plan for a radio broadcast, the
comparison made by the trier of fact should be of that plan with
the broadcast which was made by the defendant. But where,
as in the present case, the plaintiffs' property rights extend
only to the dramatic core of the play, the issue of similarity
is accordingly limited· to a comparison on the basis of an
average observer looking to that part of the literary work
which can properly be protected from infringement. Otherwise stated, dissection may be necessary to define the existence
and extent of a plaintiff's property interest, and on the issue
of similarity the test is always that of the average observer
comparing such property interest with the alleged copy made
by the defendant.
[18, 19] In support of the appellants' contention that
there is not sufficient evidence of the value of the damages sustained by the authors of the play, it is argued that all of the
evidence concerning the value of the motion picture rights is
found in the testimony of the respondents, no person with
experience in the determination of the value of such property being called to testify on their behalf. But the testimony of Faulkner, who stated his opinion in regard to the
value of the play, was not necessary as an expert for both he
and his coauthor testified as owners of the property. Each of
them told the jury that the value of the play before the
infringement was between $25,000 and $50,000 and that it had
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no value after the production and distribution of the picture.
It is a well recognized rule that the owner of property is com-

petent to testify as to its worth. (10 Ca1.Jur. 1023.) "Literary
property is not distinguished from other personal property
and is subject to the same rules and is likewise protected.
Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 538; 7 Am.Rep. 480. California has held that plaintiffs may testify to the value of an
unpublished manuscript prior to misappropriation in Barsha
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 32 Cal.App.2d 556, 90 P.2d 371."
(Unil1ersal Pictures Co. v. Harold Lloyd Corp., supra.) The
testimony of .the appellants' experts that the play contained
no material of value for motion picture purposes merely
created a conflict in the evidence.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred.
TRAYNOR, J. Dissenting.-The majority opinion in this
case, unlike that in Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
ante, p. 653 [221 P.2d 73], recognizes that the question
whether there has been copying of plaintiffs' work cannot be
submitted to the jury until it has been determined by the trial
judge that there is evidence of substantial similarity between
plaintiffs' play and defendants' motion picture with respect
to the protectible features of plaintiffs' play. With these con1licting decisions before him, may a trial judge on motion for
nonsuit or directed verdict determine on the authority of
Golding v. R.K.O. whether there is relevant similarity between
the two productions, and only if there is such similarity, deny
the motion and submit th~ case to the jury' Or must he, on
the authority of Stanley v. C.B.S., deny the motion without
consideration of the issue of relevant similarity and let the case
go to the jury before determining whether plaintiff established
a cause of action upon which the case could properly have gone
to the jury'
I cannot agree that a comparison of defendants' picture with
plaintiffs' play reveals evidence of similarity not attributable
to the use of a common idea, theme, or plot in the public domain
and therefore not subject to exclusive appropriation by any
author. I would therefore reverse the judgment.
Under Civil Code section 980·. the author of an original
composition has a property interest in it that will be protected
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against copying to the extent that it is marked by original
expression in "a concrete form, in which the circumstances and
ideas have been developed, arranged and put into shape."
(Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 409; Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S.
82 (19 S.Ct. 606, 43 L.Ed. 904].) That principle governs the
determination of a charge of piracy, whether under federal or
CQmmon law copyright. (Twentieth Century-Foz Film Corp.
v. Dieckhaus, 153 F.2d 893, 894, 897-898; Echevarria v.
Warne,. Bros. Picture•• Inc., 12 F.Supp. 632, 634; Columbia
Pictures Corp v. Krama. 65 N.Y.S.2d 67, 68.)
"Exclusive ownership" is limited to the "representation or
expression. " (Civ. Code, § 980.) Themes, ideas, and plots
in books or plays are a common fund from which every author
may draw the basic materials of his work without restriction.
They are not subject to exclusive ownership, and no author can
acquire a superior interest in a theme or plot by making an
earlier use thereof. "The copyright cannot protect the fundamental plot which was common property long before the story
was Written; it will protect the embellishments with which
the author added elements of literary value to the old plot,
but it will not operate to prohibit the presentation by someone
else of the same old plot without the particular embellishments." (London v. Biograph Co., 231 F. 696, 698-699 [145
C.C.A. 582] ; Harold Lloyd Corp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, 24;
Lewys v. O'Neill, 49 F.2d 603, 607; Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d
690,692; Nichols v. UnitJeral Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121,
122; Cam v. Unive,.sal Pictures Corp .• 47 F.Supp. 1013, 1016;
Della,. v: Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 150 F.2d 612, 613; Shipman
v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures Corp., 100 F.2d 533, 536; Fendler v.
Morosco;253 -N;Y.-281,287· fl71N.E. 56] ; see Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright, 45 Columb.L.Rev. 503, 513·
514.) The author's only property interest is in the concrete
form that he his developed by his own originality and craftsmanship, the" arrangement and combination of the ideas . . .
the form, sequence and manner in which the combination
expresses the ideas." (Bowon v. Yankee Network, Inc., 46
F.Supp. 62, 64.)
Plaintitfs have developed an unprotectible plot into an orig•
• ,' The author or proprietor of any composition iu letters or art hal
exclusive ownership iu the representation or expression thereof as
aaainst aU persons ueept one who originally and iudependently createe
the _e or • aimUar eODl'008ition.·'
aD
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inal play entitled to protection. The protection extends, however, only to its ., details, sequence of events, and manner of
expression and treatment." (Barsha v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
32 Cal.App.2d 51)6, 561 [90 P.2d 371].) Even if defendants
have taken from the play its plot, they have taken nothing of its
expression and development to which alone plaintiffs can claim
a superior right.
Plaintiffs rely on a dictum in Dam v. Kirk La 8helle, 175
F. 902, 907-908 [99 C.C.A. 392, 20 Ann.Cas. 1173, 41 L.R.A.
N.S. 1002], that a basic plot may be protected by copyright.
What the court there described as a "plot," however, was in
fact the concrete form of plaintiff's literary work appropriated
almost verbatim by the defendant. Any intimation that a plot
apart from its development and expression in a concrete form
is protectible should not have survived the decision of 8h'ip.
man v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures Corp., supra, 100 F.2d 533, 536537, 538. (See, also, Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692;
8heldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 53-54;
Christie v. Cohan, 154 F.2d 827, 828.)
The majority opinion, however, states that "the fact that
a plan or theme of the plaintiffs' story is similar to the plots
of prior stories does not defeat the claim of originality within
the meaning of that word for copyright purposes." The implication is that the plot of the play is protected by copyright if
plaintiffs conceived it independently of earlier stories in which
it is found. It is settled, however, that the plot of a literary
work is not protectible merely because the author has conceived it independently. "We assume that the plaintiff's play
is altogether original, even to an extent that in fact it is hard
to believe. We assume further that, so far as it has been
anticipated by earlier plays of which she knew nothing, that
fact is immaterial. Still, as we have already said, her copyright did not cover everything that might be drawn from her
play; its content werit to some extent into the public domain
•.. Whatever may be the difficulties a priori, we have no question on which side of the line this case falls. A comedy based
on conflicts between Irish and Jews, into which the marriage
·of their children enters, is no more susceptible of copyright
than the outline of Romeo and Juliet." (Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122; 8heldon v. Metro-Goldw1l1'
Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54; De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d
408, 410; Echevarria v. Warner BrOB. Pictures, Inc., 12 F.
6upp. 632, 635; Fendler v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281, 287 (I'll
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N.E. 56] ; MacDonald v. Du Mauriu', 75 F.Supp. 655, 660;
McConnor v. Kaufman, 49 F.Supp. 738, 744; Becker v. Loew's,
Inc., 133 F.2d 889, 892, cert. den. 319 U.S. 772 [63 S.Ct. 1438,
87 L.Ed. 1720] ; Heywood v. Jericho Co., 193 Misc. 905 [85
N.Y.S.2d 464,468].)
The majority opinion seeks to support the converse proposition by the cases of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.,
188 U.S. 239 [23 S.Ct. 298, 47 L.Ed. 460], and Fred Fisher,
Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145. Those decisions, however, support the rule of the Nichols and Sheldon cases and do not
enunciate a rule contrary thereto. In Bleistein v. Donaldson,
supra, infringement resulted from the defendants' identical
reproduction in reduced size of plaintiff's lithographs of
eircus scenes. Copying was admitted. As a defense it was
alleged that plaintiff's lithographs were picturizations of
actual scenes and living persons and he was not entitled to
eopyright thereof.. The court held that the fact that the subject of the production was in the public domain did not excuse
the theft of the concrete form in which plaintiff's original
development of the subject was expressed. "It is obvious also
that the plaintiff's case is not affected by the fact, if it be one,
that the pictures represent actual groups-visible things . . .
that fact would not deprive them of protection. The opposite
proposition would mean that a portrait by Velasquez or
Whistler was common property because others might try their
hand on the same face. Others are free to copy the original.
They are not free to copy the copy." (188 U.S. 239, 249.} It
is clear that Justice Holmes regarded as protectible only
plaintiff's originality of expression.· His holding that defendants were not free to copy the original expression and development of· a nonprotectible theme or subject cannot be distorted to mean that others are precluded from giving the same
theme a different form. One does not "copy the copy"
merely by using the same subject or theme. The "whole contribution may not be protected; for the defendants were entitled to use, not only all that had gone before, but even the
plaintiffs' contribution itself, if they drew from it only the
more general patterns; that is, if they kept clear of its •expression.'" (Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d
49, 54.)
-The same explanation applies to Judge Learned Hand's decision in the
Fred Fisher ease, holding that defendant'. identical duplication of
plainti1f'. original variation of a musieal theme constituted copyright
iDfringement. (298 F. at 150; see also bia conc1ll'riq opiBiOD in 8llipmo_
'Y.1l.K.O• ...,...)
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Since "the degree of protection afforded by the copyright
is measured by what is actually copyrightable in it; that is,
by degree and nature of the original work" (American OodB
Co. v. Bensinger, 282 F. 829, 834; Dorsey v. Old SurBty LifB
Ins. 00.,98 F.2d 872, 873), similarity between the play and the
picture not attributable to the copyrightable features of the
play is irrevelant. (Harold Lloyd Oorp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d
1, 17 ; Nicko18 v. Uniflersal Pictures Oorp.,45 F.2d 119, 121;
Oain v. Uniflersal Pictttres Oorp., 47 F.Supp. 1013, 1017;
Affiliated Enterprises v. Grltber, 86 F.2d 958, 961; De MO'1&tijo
v. Twentieth Oentury-Fox F'ilm Oorp., 40 F.Supp. 133, 138;
Shipman v. B.E.O. Badio Pictures, Inc., 100 F.2d 533, 537;
Rush v. Oursler, 39 F.2d 468, 473; Bosetl v. Loew's, Inc., 162
F.2d 785, 788; Eichel v. Marcin, 241 F. 404, 409; MacDonald
v. Du Maurier, 75 F.Supp. 655. 662; Hewitt v. Ooward, 41
N.Y.S.2d 498, 500; Oolumbia Picture. Oorp v. KrasM, 65
N.Y.S.2d 67, 69; Heywood v. Jericho 00., 193 Misc. 905 [85
N.Y.S.2d 464, 468] ; see dissenting opinion in Stanley v. O.B.S.,
antB, p. 653 [221 P.2d 73].) General similarity between
two productions attributable to their use of a common plot
drawn from the public domain, or similarity in incident
attributable to the use of common sources of material, is not
evidence of literary piracy. Unless "the two works, when
compared, show such pronounced similarities of substantial
portions of protectible material, i. e., of details, sequence of
events, and manner of expression and treatment, as to warrant
t
the inference of copying," it is error to submit the issue' of
~. copying to the jury. (Bar.ha v. Mefro-QoZdwyn.Mayer, 32
L Oal.App.2d 556, 561 [90 P.2d 371].)
Upon this principle, the federal and New York courts have
eonsistently reversed judgments for plaintiffs or granted mo" tions for dismissal or for judgment on the pleadings for
-. defendants when the only similarity between the two produc~. tions has been that attributable to the use of- a common plot.
r> In Harold Lloyd Oorp. v. Witwer, 65 F.2d 1, the N'mth Circuit
~. Court of Appeals reversed a judgment for plaintiff based on
the trial court's' finding that defendant's motion picture had
'. been copied from plaintiff's magazine story. Both works were
'baSed on the same plot : A university freshman of little
- physical ability, attempting to impress a coed with his athletic
~prowess becomes involved in a number of ludicrous 8ituatio~
':that subject him to the ridicule of the student body. Throug~

l'.:
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a series of improbable events, he involuntarily becomes a gamewinning football hero and wins the love of the girl and the
plaudits of his classmates. These similarities were held to be
irrelevant, attributable only to the "use of common materials,
and common sources of knowledge, open to all men." The
court declared that "the resemblances are either accidental or
arising from the nature of the subject" (65 F.2d at 17) and
held that the "reproduction of such non-original matter,"
even though a conscious borrowing, is not actionable copying.
(65 F.2d at 24.)
In Omstein v. Paramount Productio7l8, Inc., 9 F.Supp. 896,
plaintUf's story and defendant's motion picture were both
based on a married woman's sacrifice of her honor to pay for
her husband's medical care. In each story, the husband accepted the aid in ignorance of its source, and upon discovery
indignantly repudiated his wife. Both story and picture described the wife's struggle against adversity until her reconciliation with her husband in the picture and her death in ~
the story. The court dismissed plaintiff's bill for failure to
atate a cause of action, holding that the acknowledged similarities lay only in a common plot in the public domain. Substantial dissimilarities in treatment and development between the
two productions were held as a matter of law to preclude a
finding of copying. The same result was reached in the following eases: Heywood v. Jericho 00., 193 Misc. 905 [85 N.Y.S.2d
464] (both plays dealt with the retnrn of a Negro war hero
to his native southern community, his love for a white girl, and
their struggle against the bigotry, violence, and hatred of the
white community) ; 004Zins v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp.,
25 F.Supp. 781, 782 (both stories portrayed the life of a test
pilot) ; L07ldon v. Biograph 00., 231 F. 696 [145 C.C.A. 582]
(both stories dealt with the successful attempts of two thieves
to poison each other to avoid a division of their spoils)·; Fendler
v. Morosco, 253 N.Y. 281 [171 N.E. 561 (both plays were based
on the love of a white youth for an Hawaiian girl) ; MacDonald
v. Du Maurier, 75 F.Supp. 655 (the book "Rebecca" was
alleged to have infringed a story by plaintiff concerned also
with the conflict between a second wife and the spirit and
memory of the first) ; McOonnor v. Kaufman, 49 F.Supp. 738
(both plays dramatized the late Alexander Woolcott'8 eccentricities and interest in unsolved murders) ; Oolumbia Pictures
Corp. v. Krasna, 65 N.Y.S.2d 67 (both stories involved the
writing of letters to a soldier overseas by an adolescent girl
posing as her own older sister) ; and C•• v. Uf&ivenal Piot.,.a
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Corp., 47 F.Supp. 1013 (alleged infringement was based on
the common use of a sequence in which a storm forces the hero
and heroine to take overnight refuge in a church loft; see. also,
Dymow v. Bolto1l, 11 F.2d 690, 692: Kustoff v. Chaplin. 120
F.2d 551. 561; Lewys v. O'Net'll, 49 F.2d 603, 607; Dellar v.
Samuel Goldwyn, tnc., 40 F.Supp. 534, 536; Rush v. Our.~ler,
39 F.2d 468. 472-473; Rosen v. Loew's, 11Ic., 162 F.2d 785,
788; Eichel v. Marcin. 241 F. 404. 408-409; Lowe1lfels v.
Nathan, 2 F .Supp. 73. 80: Gropper v. Warner Bros. Pic tu.res ,
Inc., 38 F.Supp. 329, 332; Affiliated Enterprises v. Gruber,
86 F.2d 958. 961; Caruthers v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc.,
20 F.Supp. 906. 907: Christie v. Harris, 47 F.Supp. 39, 42,
d'd. sub. 110m., Christie v. Cohan, 154 F.2d 827.)
If. however, the finding of copying is supported by evidence
of similarity between two works with respect to the expression
and development of their common plot in a concrett' form
and sequence of events marked by the first authQr's craftsmanship and creative talent, a judgment for plaintiff based
thereon will be affirmed, as in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn PiI>tures Corp., 81 F.2d 49. In that case. plaintiff's play was
based on the 1857 trial in Scotland of a young woman named
Madeleine Smith, on the charge that she murdered a discarded
lover to prevent his revelation of their former intimacy to her
present fiance. "This was the story which the plaintiffs used
to build their play. As will appear they took from it but the
). merest skeleton, the acquittal of a wanton young woman. who
to extricate herself from im amour that stood in the way of
I', 8 respectable marriage, poisoned her lover. The incidents,
the characters, the mis en scene, the sequence of events, were
( 'all changed; nobody disputes that the plaintiffs were entitled
~
their copyright. All that they took from the story they
!might probably have taken bad it even been copyrighted."
~.' (81 F.2d at 50.) From this "merest skeleton'J plaintiffs
,i. developed an original story of sensuality and murder suggested by th~ events upon which it was based. Defendant's
!'motion picture presented not just a similar story based on
f' the same facts (which would have been permissible even if it
were suggested by plaintiff's play), but substantially the same
details, sequence of events. manner of expression and develop';ment, and often the same dialogue. that gave plAintiffs' play its
;;; . character of originality and concreteness of form. The Second
~)Circnit Court of Appeals reversed a decree of dismissal. stating
that although plaintiffs could not preclude any subsequent
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use of the same source of material or story outline or the deliberate borrowing of their plot, they were entitled to protection
against piracy of their original contribution to that plot in 8
concrete form. Since similarity between the two works Willi
manifested by a parallelism of incident and detail originally
developed by plaintiffs, an inference of copying was held to
be reasonable. In DB Acosta v. Bro'W1&, 146 F.2d 408, 410,
both works were based ~n the .life of Clara Barton,but there
was similarity between them in the names of seven principal
characters (of the six fictional names one accidentally misspelled name in plaintiff's story was identically reproduced
in defendant's), in a fietional romance between Miss Barton
and a young gold prospector even as to the details of its
genesis and termination, and in the complete sequential development of the story outline. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, emphasized
that the finding of infringement was supported by evidence of
similarity in expression and development and not by similarity
in the plot of the two storif'.8 or in their use of historical
material. (See, also, Bars/,a v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 32 Cal.
App.2d 556, 561 [90 P.2d 371], and Universal Picturu 00.,
Inc. v. Harold Lloyd Oorp., 162 F.2d 354, 360, in which judgments for the plaintiffs were held supported by evidence of the
use of identical comedy sequences originally developed by
the plaintiffs, not by similarities resulting· from the use of
the same plot.)
Admittedly, both play and picture in the present case
utilize the same basic plot, the story of a paranoiac ship's
captain obs:essed by his position and authority, engaged by
an opponent aboard his ship, and defeated by that opponent
and by his own meIf-tal collapse. If a plot apart from its
expression in a concrete form were protectible. the first use of
this. plot would have withdrawn from all subsequent use a
most fertile field for the production of stories of the sea. The
captain and his opponent have long been stock sea story
material. They were present in the persons of Captain Bligh
and Fletcher Christian of "Mutiny on the Bounty," of Wolf
Larsen and Humphrey van Weyden of "The Sea Wolf," and
in the principals of numerous other stories of ships and the men
who man them. It is immaterial, however, whether the plot
common to play and picture is old or new; the only protection
plaintiffs can claim under copyright law is limited to its
,expression and development in a concrete form. In the present
ease there is no substantial evidence of similarity betweea the
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play and picture with respect to the features protected b,
copyright. "When one attempts comparison of the two works,
in those matters as to which copyright protects-that is, the
spirit or soul infusing the creatures of the author's imagination, what they desire, and how they go about achievement, the·
reasons for their actions, and the words in which such reasons
are expretlSed-I can see nothing but differences." (FraMsl
v. lnoin. 34 F.2d 142, 144; MacDonald v. Du Maurier, W
F.Supp. 655, 662.)
Plaintifl'.. ' captain (Crawley) is an impostor, an actor who
knows nothhl( of seamansrUp, who has killed the real captain
to get aboal'd the boat and bring about the death of an enemy
(Brancato) he believes has ruthlessly stifled the acting ability
that he (Crawley) may now display. He exults in the power he
possesses, but only because he holds it by virtue of his ability
to act the part of the captain. He is obsessed by his art, not
by his authority. He challenges Brancato to expose him, to
demonstrate that by his consummate acting he can make others
believe only what he wants them to believe. He kills only
because murder is necessary to the maintenance of his pretense. He hates Brancato and attempts to drive him to suicide.
When he believes he has accomplished his purpose, he takes his
own life in fear and remorse. The form and development of
thili story, the embellishment of incident and detail, give the
play the stamp of plaintiffs' originality and entitle it to protection, but only against piracy of the protectible features.
Defendants. however, have taken from plaintiffs' play, if
anything, only that whi~h is common property. In order to use
an old ship set not then in use, they used a story outline a
great deal older and more timeworn. They added to it nothing
, not already in the public domain; certainly they added to it no
ingredient for which plaintiffs can claim protectioll. Their
t, . story was built on a tyrannical captain, his abuse of authority,
and his eventual defeat. Their captain (Stone) is a veteran
of the sea, competent and experienced. Pride in his authority
has become an obsession, driving him insane. He kills only
to prove his authority.. He does not hate his opponent, Mert riam, whose only common denominator with plaintiffs' Brancato is his opposition to an insane captain. He does not com-.
mit suicide,but is killed to prevent the murder of Merriam.
"This incomplete skeleton the two plays have in common, but
~ it is with real difficulty that the' flesh and blood, the incidental,
yet essential, adornment and trimming, of the plays can be

f
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cut away to show similarity between a few bones." (Dymow
v Bolton, 11 F.2d 690, 692.) Here, as in Stanley v. C.B.S.,
ante, p. 653 l221 P.2d 73], defendant's motions for nonsuit, directed verdict, and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict raised the question whether there \vas substantial evidence of relevant similarity to justify the submission of the
ease to the jury for a determination whether that similarity was
the result of copying. In denying the motions, the trial court
erroneously determined that there was suhstantial evidence
of relevant similarity. In reversing the judgment, this court
would not be substituting its judgment for that of the jury
on a question of fact, but would determine merely that there
was insufficient .evidence to support a finding of copying.
(Nickols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 }I'.2d 119, 121, 122;
Hewitt v. Coward, 41 N.Y.S.2d 498,500; Dorsey v. Old Surety
Life Ins. Co., 98 F.2d 872, 874; Soy Food Milu, Inc. v. Pillsbury Mills, Inc., 161 F.2d 22, 25.) I would therefore reverse
the judgment.
Spence, J., concurred.
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent.
Certainly there was no necessity for the defendants to read
plaintiffs' "The Man and His Shadow" in order to obtain the
"basic plot," or its subordinates, as depicted in "The Ghost
. Ship"; they needed only to turn to "The Universal Plot
Catalog" (Henry Albert Phillips) or to "Story Plotting Simplified" (Eric Heath). In the last named work (which admittedly only suggests further subclassi:fications or applications of the fundamental law] proclaimed by Georges poltr')
we find in chapter XIX (subsituation 15 of the sixteenth situation) the following listing :
"Madman
Victim
sea-captain
His crew
And in chapter XXVII we find:
"Superior Rival
Inferior Rival
., A sea-captain
His first mate
c. A

The Cause"
Insanity"

The Object"
A native girl"

L, 'There are only thirty-six fund8.mental dramatie 8ituatiOn.ll, varioua
facetll of which form the basis of all human drama." ("The Thirty-Six
Dramatic Situations," by Georges Polti, 1916.)
'Recognition of the "Jaw" antedates Polti; Goethe reJates tha~
"Gozzi maintained that there can be but thirty-six tragic [dramatic]
aituations. Schiller took great pains to find more. bm Jwa ... 1DI&ble te
tiIWi ..... 10 JaU.)' as Gozai."
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These situations, it seems to me, are too well and widely
known and have been too often written about, to admit of
present proprietorship in them merely as such. They might be
used in something original but they are not original. Yet it
is only in relationship to these situations that any similarity
between play and picture can be found. They fit ., The
Ghost Ship" almost precisely; indubitably they constitute the
so-called "basic plot" or "central core" of the pictured story;
they fit it far more closely than does any situation portrayed
in plaintiffs' sketch; and they were free to defendants' use.
Plainti1l's' sketch, likewise, uses formulae plot and subordinates. It avails of a mad sea-captain, a passenger instead
of a crewman, and, as the cause, descends to jealousy-mad
jealousy. Jealousy, in the Thirty-Second Situation of Polti,
is labeled "Mistaken Jealousy." "The reason," says Heath,
"is that jealousy in itself is not dramatic." Even "Mistaken
Jealousy" has poor emotional value and "the usual solution
[which plaintiffs have adopted] ... -a murder, suicide,
divorce, or separation-is extremely hackneyed and undramatic." (Italics added.) Plaintiffs' use of the equally hackneyed "pursuit-escape" technique and" A hurricane A vessel
Seamanship" may be found clearly depicted and specifically
listed in Heath's exposition of Polti's law. (Fifth Situation,
chap. VIII.)
Regardless of whether similarity or protectibility should be
first determined it seems obvious in this case that plaintUf
cannot recover. The majority opinion admits that "the basic
- dramatic core of the plaintiffs' play constitutes the truly
original and valuable feature of'it . . . [That,] in the present
f case, the plaintiffs' property rights extend only to the dramatic
i,' core ... " It might as well be claimed on behalf of plainti1l's
i,' that they possess a common law copyright to the origination
and use of some certain word already in common usage. To see
f~-'. if the claim to originality and proprietorship in such comt bination of letters could possibly be tenable we should first
\ . turn to a dictionary and' if we found that combination as a
; recognized word in the "public domain" of the English
language we should go no further in listening to plaintiffs'
claim. Here we need only turn to the dramaturgic equivalent
of a dictionary-a catalog of plots in the public domain of
. literature-to find the "central core"-the admittedly sole
t basis of plaintiffs' claim of a protectible element.
, So far as I know, no copyrights or other forms of literary
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protection have heretofore been granted as to the literary use
of madmen, sea-captains or murders, as such. I find nothing
of literary novelty in the portrayal, by either plaintiffs or
defendants, of dominant and secondary characters; nor in the
concept that a ship's captain has supreme authority over his
command on the high seas and may demonstrate a mad llist for
or brutal exercise of power; nor in the proposition that a
paranoiac may captain a ship or be a killer; nor in the manner
; . . .hi,,}, t}, ....
hnv.. ....
l .._-_
m ..nt.R.
them.
have been put
_w"
"'" ......
... __ , 01'
.- anv
--'" of
together by either plaintiff's or defendants. In any event the
similarity, if any, between the story by plaintiffs and the picture by defendants lies exclusively in the plots which are in
the public domain, not in the treatment thereof which originality could make protectible.
As I view the film, if it possesses any quality at all which may
be said to give it character, originality or any element of
literary protectibility. that quality would seem to be a combination of details in production, an imprint of the artistries
of director and actor. But, insofar as plot or, as the majority
denominate it, "central core," is concerned, I am satisfied .that
neither the story told by plaintiffs nor that pictured in the
film, can be said to possess in this decade any element of originality qualifying it to be the subject of exclusive literary property rights and protectibility. In some aspects each plot is at
least as old as Shakespeare' and. since Polti, the whole substance of each has been but a published formula. And if either
work does possess originality in substance, structure or form
sufficient to make it protectible as literary property, then,
measured by an equal standard, it surely follows that the film
is so different from plaintiffs' story as to preclude plaintiffs'
recovery for plagiarismJ
.
The Ghost Ship sailed but I think neither it nor its author
was engaged in piracy; and I think upholding the judgment
in this case supports a result which approaches closer to
piracy than did any act of the defendants. Certainly the
individual writer should have ample protection for his literary
enterprise but zeal to protect him should not lead to straitjacketing producers against what appears here to have been
but a legitimate exercise of their own freedom of enterprise
in an open field.
.lU
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"See MacBeth, Hamlet, Othello, King Lear; lee also the works listed b,.
Polti UDder exampks of the Twent;r-Fourth Situation, subela88i11.catiOll
A. (IJ).
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For the reasons stated 1 would reverse both the judgment
and the order denying the motion for judgment notwithstand.
ing the verdict.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied August 31,
1950. Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted for a
rehearing.

